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Abstract: School choice policies are intended to provide students in poorly performing schools 
the option of transferring to a better school. The associated loss of funding to new competitors 
is expected, in turn, to benefit students who remain in their assigned schools by spurring 
improved performance among the educators in them. The prospects for such systemic 
improvement are greatest if in fact student transfers and the market signals they provide are 
determined by school effectiveness rather than the social and racial characteristics of a district’s 
students. To test this proposition, we employ a series of fixed effects regressions to analyze the 
relative influence of school effectiveness versus student demographic composition on 
participation rates in Michigan’s charter school and inter-district choice policies. Our results 
indicate that school effectiveness has no systematic influence on participation rates for either 
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choice policy, while the loss of students to choice options increases significantly in districts 
serving high concentrations of low-income students. Therefore, Michigan’s school choice 
policies create financial pressures not on schools that are performing most poorly but rather on 
those that face the most difficult educational challenges.  
Keywords: charter schools; school competition; school effectiveness; social and racial 
characteristics. 
 
Tasas de participación en la elección de escuela: ¿cuáles son los distritos presionados?  
Resumen: Las políticas de elección de escuela tienen por objetivo ofrecer a los alumnos de 
establecimientos de bajo rendimiento la opción de transferirse a una escuela mejor. A la vez, se 
espera que la pérdida de financiamiento asociada a favor de los nuevos competidores beneficie a los 
estudiantes que permanezcan en las escuelas asignadas, estimulando el mejor rendimiento de los 
educadores de dichas escuelas . Las probabilidades de que se dé esta mejora sistémica son mayores si 
de hecho las transferencias de estudiantes y las señales de mercado que surjan de éstas son 
determinadas por la eficacia escolar antes que por las características sociales y raciales del alumnado 
de un distrito. Para probar esta proposición, se emplean una serie de regresiones de efectos fijos para 
analizar la influencia relativa sobre las tasas de participación de la eficacia escolar frente a la 
composición demográfica de los estudiantes en la escuela pública de gestión autónoma (escuela 
charter) en el estado de  Michigan y en las políticas de elección inter-distritales. Nuestros resultados 
muestran que la eficacia escolar no tiene una influencia sistemática sobre las tasas de participación de 
cada política de elección, mientras que la pérdida de estudiantes en favor de opciones de elección 
aumenta significativamente en distritos que atienden altas concentraciones de estudiantes de bajos 
ingresos. Por lo tanto, las políticas de elección escolar del estado de Michigan crean presiones 
financieras no en aquellas escuelas con rendimiento más pobre sino en aquellas que enfrentan 
desafíos educativos más complejos.  
Palabras clave: escuela charter; competencia escolar; eficacia escolar; características sociales y 
raciales.      
 
As taxas de participação na escolha da escola: Quais são os distritos sob pressão? 
Resumo: As políticas de escolha da escola são projetadas para fornecer aos alunos de escolas 
de baixo desempenho acadêmico a opção de transferência para uma escola melhor. Ao mesmo 
tempo, espera-se que a associada perda de financiamento para novos concorrentes beneficie os 
alunos que ficam nas escolas a eles destinadas, estimulando o melhor desempenho dos 
educadores dessas escolas. A probabilidade de que essas melhoras sejam 
dadas sistemicamente são melhores se de fato as transferências de estudantes e os sinais de 
mercado resultantes destas fossem determinados pela eficácia da escola e não pelas 
características sociais e raciais dos alunos em um bairro. Para testar esta proposição, foram 
utilizadas uma série de regressões de efeitos fixos para analisar a influência relativa sobre as 
taxas de participação de eficácia da escola em contraste com a composição demográfica dos 
alunos de escolas charter no estado de Michigan e as políticas de escolha interdistrital. Nossos 
resultados mostram que a eficácia da escola não tem qualquer influência sistemática sobre as 
taxas de participação de cada escolha política, enquanto a perda de alunos em favor de opções 
de escolha é significativamente maior nos distritos que servem altas concentrações 
de estudantes de baixa renda. Assim, as políticas de escolha da escola em Michigan não criam 
pressão financeira sobre as escolas com o pior desempenho, mas naquelas que 
enfrentam desafios educacionais mais complexos. 
Palavras-chave: escola charter; competição escolar; eficácia da escola; características sociais e 
raciais. 
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Introduction  
Discussions of how school choice will affect students who remain in their assigned public 
schools have been dominated by two opposing arguments. Choice advocates maintain that if choice 
policies offer parents expanded options and tie funding to enrollment, then educators in nearby 
traditional public schools will have an incentive to compete and increase their effectiveness and 
efficiency by working harder and implementing educational improvements (Chubb & Moe, 1990; 
Finn, Vanourek, & Manno, 2000; Nathan 1996).1 Critics, on the other hand, have argued that choice 
policies are unlikely to benefit all students, but rather create winners and losers relative to the status 
quo, increasing academic, racial, and social class stratification while further concentrating many of the 
most disadvantaged students in schools depleted of the personnel and resources needed for 
improvement (See Ladd, 2002 for a review). As charter schools and other choice policies proliferate 
it is clearly important to gain a better understanding of how they affect the performance of the 
public school system for better or worse, since, for the foreseeable future, the vast majority of 
students will remain in traditional public schools (TPSs).   
A body of rigorous quantitative studies of school choice policies’ competitive effects on TPS 
performance has begun to take shape in recent years. Thus far, the initial results do not provide 
much support for the prediction that choice and competition improve TPS outcomes (See e.g., 
Bettinger, 2005; Bifulco & Ladd, 2006a; Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg, & Jansen, 2008; Ni, 2009; 
Sass, 2006; Zimmer & Buddin, 2009). These studies generally test for the existence of a causal 
relationship between changes in the degree of choice competition TPSs face and the performance of 
their students on standardized tests, holding constant student background characteristics. Recent 
surveys of this evidence conclude that the competitive effects are quite mixed and generally small 
(Arsen & Ni, 2008; Gill & Booker, 2008; Ni & Arsen, 2010; Rouse & Barrow, 2009). Some studies 
find positive competitive effects, while others find no effect, or negative effects.  
Another body of studies, which we discuss in greater detail below, has utilized student-level 
data to analyze the influence of student and school characteristics on the decisions of active 
choosers to opt out of their assigned schools (e.g., Bifulco, Ladd, & Ross, 2009).  The main 
objective of these studies is to understand how the re-sorting of students through school choice 
policies affects racial and socioeconomic stratification in schools and the peer environments 
encountered by different students. 
This paper investigates a key and unresolved aspect of the systemic effects of choice 
competition by examining the characteristics of districts that experience the greatest competitive 
challenges under state-level school choice policies. Variations in the level of competitive pressure 
across districts are determined jointly by the responses to choice policies by actors on both the 
demand and supply sides of the education market. In assessing choice policies’ systemic effects, it is 
important to know whether the treatment (competition) is applied primarily where the prior public 
school performance is weakest. This issue has been submerged in recent studies of choice policies’ 
competitive effects, yet the prospects for these policies to enhance overall TPS effectiveness are 
diminished if choice participation is not greatest where preexisting school effectiveness is lowest. 
Insofar as choices are based on considerations other than school quality, choice policies can create 
                                                
1 Formally, school effectiveness is defined as student achievement (or other desired outcome) controlling for 
the incoming achievement of students. School efficiency, also referred to as productivity, is defined as student 
achievement (or other desired outcome) per dollar spent, controlling for the incoming achievement of 
students. In this paper, we use the terms school effectiveness and school performance interchangeably. 
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the wrong type of competition. Alternatively, if TPS administrators believe that student choices are 
being driven by factors beyond their control, they may not respond to new competitors.  
Our empirical work focuses on Michigan, which passed a charter school law in 1993 and 
established a statewide inter-district choice policy in 1996. Participation rates in both choice policies 
are high by comparison to other states, and many Michigan districts, especially those in urban areas, 
have experienced strong budgetary pressures associated with the loss of students to school choice 
competitors.  
Conceptual Background and Previous Studies 
The prediction that competition will induce improved public school performance turns on a 
set of anticipated behavioral responses by households and schools which have been modeled 
formally by Hoxby (2003). In the first instance, students (and parents) are expected to select higher 
quality schools, defined as schools that more efficiently produce desired student outcomes. School 
personnel, in turn, have an incentive to improve their performance lest they lose students and 
resources to other schools. In practice, however, choice participation rates may be influenced by a 
host of considerations, and the primacy of TPS efficiency (or effectiveness) has yet to be established. 
In general, student transfers generated by a choice policy will be a function of the combined actions 
of participants on the demand and supply sides of the educational market subject to the rules 
embedded in the choice policies themselves and features of the local context in which they are 
implemented.  
Consider first the demand side of the education market. Choice participation rates will be a 
function of the nature and extent of parents’ dissatisfaction with their children’s assigned public 
schools. Any local education system reflects the history of past household choices. Some parents 
have changed their residence to gain access to more desirable TPSs. Others have chosen to send 
their children to private schools at their own expense, or to educate their children at home. Families 
make the best choices they can given their preferences, subject to their incomes and the prices of 
alternative options. Some households remain dissatisfied with their local district schools, and the 
average level of dissatisfaction in a district is likely to decline with average family income. While 
families have preferences regarding many school attributes (including school safety, proximity, 
extracurricular activities, and facility conditions), we focus on school academic effectiveness, on the 
one hand, and student socioeconomic or racial composition, on the other, because these factors 
have long been at the center of choice policy discussions (Carnoy, et al., 2005; Friedman, 1962; 
Levin, 2009).  
   The relative importance of assigned school quality and demographic composition in families’ 
school choices remains unresolved. Previous research indicates that although parents commonly cite 
school quality as a primary reason for choosing a given charter school, their actual choices can be 
largely predicted by student racial and SES composition (Holme & Richards, 2009; Lacireno-Paquet 
& Brantley, 2008; Weiher & Tedin, 2002). Even when parents highly value school academic quality 
in selecting schools, they often lack good information about it. In such situations they may use more 
visible features, including student demographics as proxies for school quality (Fiske & Ladd, 2000; 
Schneider & Buckley, 2002).  
Previous studies offer suggestive insights regarding the influence of assigned school 
effectiveness as opposed to student racial or social class characteristics in family school choices. 
Several studies of parental choice have shown that student demographics matter. White students and 
students from higher-income families tend to use charter schools and inter-district choice to opt out 
of schools with high concentrations of disadvantaged students, while low-income students of color 
sometimes transfer from mostly White and more affluent districts to districts with greater 
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percentages of children from their own backgrounds (See e.g., Bifulco & Ladd, 2006b; Bifulco, 
Ladd, & Ross, 2009; Holme & Richards, 2009; Ni, forthcoming). Results from studies examining 
whether students are moving from lower to higher-performing schools are, however, mixed (e.g., 
Koedel, Betts, Rice, & Zau, 2009; Weiher & Tedin, 2002).  
Only a few studies have directly compared the combined effect of assigned school student 
composition and academic effectiveness on parental choices. Each of these studies point to the 
strong influence of assigned school demographic characteristics, but the influence of school quality 
is inconsistent or unclear. Booker, Zimmer, & Buddin (2005) observed charter school students in 
California and Texas who were in a regular public school the previous year. In Texas, charter school 
students came from regular public schools with below average achievement and with achievement 
levels below their peers in those schools. This result, however, might reflect a supply-side feature of 
the Texas charter school program, namely the strong preference given to authorizing charter schools 
for at-risk students. Their findings for California were more mixed. In addition, in regressions 
designed to explain a student’s decision to move to a charter school, the results for assigned school 
math and reading scores were inconsistent.2 Meanwhile, Bifulco, Ladd and Ross (2009) find that 
students’ decisions to opt out of their assigned schools are positively correlated to an index of 
attendance zone disadvantage, but since zone disadvantage embodies both social and academic 
features—defined as the percent of parents with no college and the percent of students with low 
achievement—the influence of assigned school academic outcomes alone is unclear. 
On balance, while past demand-side studies of the determinants of family school choices 
have documented patterns of student re-sorting under choice policies, such studies do not provide 
clear evidence on our central research question of whether choice participation rates are inversely 
related to district academic effectiveness. Yet even if such studies were more conclusive on this 
point, they overlook important supply-side considerations that contribute to inter-community 
variations in choice participation rates. Whatever families’ schooling demands, if they are to become 
effective, there must be a corresponding supply of schools.  
  The actions of schools on the supply side of the education market will be shaped by a range 
of considerations beyond simply meeting consumer demand. Among them are the rules and 
regulations governing choice policy implementation. Charter school and inter-district choice policies 
are designed so differently they are likely to elicit very different supply side responses. The supply of 
charter schools, for example, will turn on provisions in state laws that stipulate which entities can 
grant charters (e.g., school districts versus state-level agencies) and whether the number of charters 
is limited. Moreover, state laws may restrict the establishment of charter schools to certain districts 
or provide incentives to influence charter location. In decisions about where to establish charter 
schools, charter authorizers and charter management organizations may take account of many 
considerations aside from the academic effectiveness of local traditional public schools (Gulosino & 
Lubienski, 2011; Gulosino & d’Entremont, 2011). And they may be strongly swayed by political 
pressure to open charter schools in some communities or avoid the establishment of new 
competitors in other local areas. Location decisions will also be influenced by practical 
considerations such as the availability of buildings, transportation access, or whether an area 
possesses sufficient population density to sustain a new school. Thus far, however, we have 
relatively little systematic information on the determinants of supply-side behavior in the education 
market. 
One exception is Glomm, Harris, & Lo’s (2005) study of Michigan charter school location. 
Utilizing district-level data, they find that the number of charter schools increases in districts with 
                                                
2 In Texas, assigned school reading scores were significant, but not math; In California, math was significant 
but not reading.   
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more diverse populations in terms of race and parental education, while the results for district 
effectiveness and efficiency are mixed. Although suggestive, the number of charter schools in a 
district is not a reliable measure of charter school participation rates. Moreover, Glomm, et al. do 
not account for the fact that many Michigan students attend charter schools that are located outside 
their district of residence. As we will note, more than one-third of Michigan’s charter schools draw 
the majority of their students from districts other than the district in which the charter school is 
located. 
In the case of inter-district choice, supply-side actions will also be shaped by a host of 
considerations aside from the relative effectiveness of different public schools. Districts’ supply of 
openings for nonresidents will depend on the rules in a state’s inter-district choice policy. How 
much funding do nonresident students bring with them to a district?  What criteria may districts 
utilize in determining which nonresidents students they admit?  Districts’ capacity to admit 
nonresident students, moreover, will be heavily influenced by the pace of their recent enrollment 
growth. Declining-enrollment districts are likely to have excess capacity, while rapidly growing 
districts are not. Districts may also anticipate how nonresident students are likely to change the racial 
or socioeconomic composition of its students. Community resistance to altering a local district’s 
established racial or social composition may create supply-side restrictions on openings for inter-
district transfers.  
In short, despite strong predictions that school choice participation will be highest in 
districts where students’ assigned schools are least effective, the evidence thus far is not nearly as 
robust as one might expect. Past demand-side studies of family school choices are inconclusive 
regarding the influence of school effectiveness. And such studies fail to recognize a range of supply-
side factors that could substantially influence inter-community variations in the school choice 
participation rates.  
In this paper, we analyze the determinants of inter-community variations in the proportion 
of district residents who participate in school choice policies. The issue is important, because it 
defines which districts experience the greatest financial pressure from choice policies. That financial 
pressure, in turn, is supposed to be the stimulus for improved district performance. We do not 
directly model family decision making or ask which students are leaving a given district and why. 
Rather we conduct a reduced-form, district-level analysis that implicitly embodies the decisions of 
actors on the demand and supply sides of the education market. We focus on the relative influence 
of district academic effectiveness and student composition on students’ participation rates in 
Michigan’s two mature choice policies—charter schools and inter-district choice. 
Michigan School Choice Context 
Passed in 1993, Michigan’s charter school law authorizes several agencies to grant charters, 
including local and intermediate school districts, community colleges, and state universities. Most 
charters in Michigan have been granted by the governing boards of state universities. Charter 
schools have no geographic boundaries; students are free to attend any charter school in the state on 
a space available basis. Random selection by lottery, with certain exceptions, must be used if the 
number of applicants exceeds available space. Charter schools can serve any grades but most in 
Michigan serve students only in the K-8 range. 
Originally, no limit was imposed on the number of charters that could be issued by any of 
the authorizing boards. However, in 1996, following a proliferation of charters issued by the board 
of Central Michigan University, the state legislature imposed a cap of 150 on the total number of 
schools that may be chartered by the state’s 15 public universities. Since there is no cap on the 
number of schools chartered by other organizations, however, the number of charter schools has 
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continued to grow. By 2005, the state hosted 226 charter schools that enrolled about 95,000 students 
(or 5.9 percent of the state’s public school population).  
In 1996, the Michigan legislature created an inter-district choice program, commonly known 
as the “schools of choice” program. Every district (school board) can decide each year whether to 
admit nonresident students and specify the number of available slots by school building and grade 
level. Districts can also specify whether or not students transferring in must reside within the county 
where the district is located. Districts cannot prohibit students who live within their boundaries 
from attending another district that admits them. Once admitted, nonresident students can continue 
attending a district’s schools until they graduate. Districts are not required under the law to provide 
transportation for out-of-district students; some districts provide transportation, others do not. By 
2005, more than 400 out of 552 school districts accepted inter-district choice students. About 65,000 
students (or 4.1 percent of the state’s public school population) participated in inter-district choice.  
Michigan’s finance system, established with the passage of Proposal A in 1994, has facilitated 
the development of the state’s school choice programs. Michigan’s districts and charter schools 
receive almost all their discretionary operational revenues in the form of per-pupil foundation 
grants. The amount of the grants is determined by the state and districts have essentially no 
authority to raise local taxes to generate additional school funding. Each charter school receives per-
pupil funding approximately equal to the district in which it is located. For inter-district choice 
students, the revenue follows automatically to the districts where they enroll. Districts receive the 
lesser of the foundation allowance of the resident district or the enrolling district. Enrolling districts 
are prohibited from charging tuition in any form to make up any revenue differences. Proposal A 
creates relatively strong fiscal incentives for schools to compete for students. With the declining 
value of real per-pupil foundation grants in all Michigan public schools since 2002, the only way for 
schools to increase their revenue is to attract more students.  
Where Does School Choice Take Place? 
Table 1 shows the uneven growth of participation in Michigan’s two school choice programs 
across different types of communities.3 By 2007, more than 11% of the state’s public school 
students attended charter schools or district schools outside their district of residence through inter-
district choice. In Michigan, school choice remains primarily an urban phenomenon. Central city and 
low-income suburban districts (generally adjacent to central cities) have experienced the sharpest 
enrollment losses due to choice competition. Some urban districts, including the state’s largest, 
Detroit, have lost roughly a third of their resident students to charter schools and inter-district 
choice combined. No one familiar with Michigan schools doubts that school administrators in 
Michigan’s urban districts are acutely aware of the financial impacts that the state’s school choice 
policies have had on their districts. By contrast, neither choice policy poses much threat to high-
                                                
3 We define a five-way classification of school district community types. Central city districts are those that the 
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) classifies as serving large cities and mid-sized cities. Rural 
includes districts classified by NCES as outside a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) plus those within an 
MSA with population density less than 20 people per square mile. Suburban district are those classified by 
NCES as “serving an MSA but not primarily its central city” and having population density greater than 20 
people per square mile. The suburban classification is disaggregated based on median home value (MHV) in 
the 2000 U.S. Census—Low-income suburb: $32,500 <MHV< $75,000; Middle-income suburb: 
$75,001!MHV<$170,000; High-income suburb: MHV"$170,000. Low-income suburban districts are very 
similar to Michigan’s central cities in racial composition and student poverty rates. 
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income suburban school districts. Rural areas on average have very low participation rates in charter 
schools, but rates of inter-district choice participation above the statewide average.  
 
Table 1  
Percent of resident students participating in Michigan’s two school choice programs in selected years 
Community type 2002 2005 2007 
 Charter school attendance 
Central city 14.7 21.1 25.4 
Low-income suburb 5.4 12.2 12.8 
Mid-income suburb 2.0 2.9 3.6 
High-income suburb 0.8 1.2 1.2 
Rural 1.4 1.9 2.0 
Total 4.2 5.9 6.5 
    
 Transferring in through inter-district choice 
Central city 0.5 1.0 1.2 
Low-income suburb 7.7 12.3 17.3 
Mid-income suburb 3.3 5.4 6.3 
High-income suburb 0.6 1.3 1.8 
Rural 3.6 5.3 6.0 
Total 2.6 4.1 4.9 
    
 Transferring out through inter-district choice 
Central city 3.7 6.0 8.5 
Low-income suburb 5.6 9.0 10.5 
Mid-income suburb 2.0 3.5 4.2 
High-income suburb 0.4 0.8 0.9 
Rural 3.8 5.5 6.4 
Total 2.6 4.1 4.9 
    
 Combined % of students lost to two choice programs* 
Central city 17.9 26.1 32.7 
Low-income suburb 3.3 9.0 6.0 
Mid-income suburb 0.7 1.0 1.5 
High-income suburb 0.6 0.8 0.3 
Rural 1.5 2.1 2.3 
Total 4.2 5.9 6.5 
*Calculated as resident students attending charter schools plus net loss to inter-district choice as a 
percentage of resident students. 
 
At first glance, one might surmise that the pattern of school choice activity across Michigan 
communities indicates higher participation rates where school academic performance is weakest. 
The top panel of Table 2 displays the average percentage of students meeting the proficient 
performance levels on the Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP) tests in 4th and 7th 
grade math and reading through 1995-2005.4 Variations in achievement levels across community 
                                                
4 The 7th grade math scores pertain only to the 1995-2000 period, since this test was discontinued between 
2000 and 2005. 
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types mirror school choice participation rates. Central city and low-income suburban districts have 
low levels of student achievement and high choice participation, while high-income suburbs have 
relatively high levels of student achievement and low levels of choice participation. Based on this 
sort of simple comparison—indeed the sort of casual inference that is sometimes made by state 
policy makers and in media accounts—it would appear that choice activity is concentrated in areas 
where traditional public schools are least effective. 
Such a conclusion would be premature, however, since both school choice participation and 
standardized test scores are highly correlated with student demographic characteristics (e.g., poverty 
and race) which also vary systematically across community types. As shown in the bottom panel of 
Table 2, among community types, central city and low-income suburban districts have the highest 
rates of students of color (except Asians), students with disabilities, and students receiving free or 
reduced-price lunch. So it remains unclear whether levels of choice activity are driven primarily by 
schools’ academic effectiveness or the demographic characteristics of their students.  
 
Table 2   
Percent of students reaching proficiency on the MEAP exam and student characteristics, by community type, 1995-
2005 
 Central 
city 
Low-
income 
suburb 
Mid-
income 
suburb 
High-
income 
suburb 
Rural 
      
4th Grade math 54.9 51.6 71.2 81.3 66.0 
4th Grade reading 49.0 45.7 63.1 73.6 58.0 
7th Grade  math* 37.1 34.1 59.1 72.9 53.9 
7th Grade  reading 38.0 34.3 54.0 66.2 49.7 
      
% Free-reduced lunch 56.8 58.7 22.8 6.9 35.9 
% African-American 42.0 40.1 5.8 2.5 1.2 
% Hispanic 8.7 6.0 3.0 1.3 2.3 
% Asian 1.8 1.1 1.3 3.6 0.4 
      
*Figures for 7th grade math correspond to 1995 to 2000, when the test was discontinued. 
Method 
In order to disentangle the influences of different factors on choice participation rates across 
school districts, we employ fixed effects regressions to estimate the following equation: 
 
% Choiceit = 1* Performanceit + DitB2 + RitB3 + i + It + it  (1) 
 
The dependent variable, % Choiceit, measures (a) the percentage of resident students attending 
charter schools or (b) the net outflow of inter-district choice students as a percentage of resident 
students, respectively, for school district i in year t. Student performance is measured variously as the 
percentage of students reaching proficiency in math or reading. Dit is a vector of student 
demographic characteristics of district i in year t, including the percentages of students who are 
eligible for free or reduced priced lunch, who have disabilities, and who are African-American, 
Hispanic, and Asian. Rit is a vector of resource allocation characteristics of district i in year t, 
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including per pupil expenditure, the percentage of current operating expenditures devoted to 
instruction, and the average pupil-teacher ratio. 
We control district-specific characteristics that are unobserved but related to choice 
participation rates in i. For example, it is reasonable to expect charter schools to attract students 
from areas where parents have particular preferences and tastes for their children’s education or 
from communities where parents are more motivated or better informed. These unobserved district 
characteristics will cause estimation bias if not controlled. Fixed effects regressions overcome this 
problem by removing i, the time-invariant unobserved district characteristics that influence choice 
participation rates. A set of year dummies, It, is included to capture any systematic influence not 
accounted for by the observable inputs that vary over time but are common to all districts. it is the 
idiosyncratic error term. The estimated influence of school performance on school choice 
participation will be captured by the coefficient , while the influence of student demographic 
characteristics will be captured by the vector of coefficients of . We refer to our performance 
variables as measures of effectiveness, but since Equation (1) controls for expenditures, the 
performance variables can also be interpreted as measures of district efficiency. 
One might imagine that families’ school choices in any given year will be based on the 
information available in the previous year. In addition, it is possible that school choice generates 
changes in district student composition in unobserved ways, which in turn could change its 
performance levels. To rule out this possibility of reverse causation and to model decision making 
such that it is based on prior period information, we also estimate Equation (1) using one year lags 
of all the predicators, including performance, demographic information, and district resource 
allocation characteristics.  
One challenge arises in the estimation of Equation (1) for charter school participation. Since 
charter school enrollment is measured as the percentage of public school students residing in school 
district i who attended charter schools, the variable only takes on nonnegative values. Therefore, its 
distribution is highly skewed toward zero, with a large proportion of observations clustered at zero, 
since many districts had no students attending charter schools. Consequently, estimation by regular 
linear regression will result in negative predicted values and distort the relationship between charter 
participation rates and school effectiveness and student characteristics. To solve this problem, we 
round the percentage of charter enrollment to the nearest 1 so that it takes on only nonnegative 
integer values and we can easily interpret it as the number of students attending charter schools for 
every 100 students residing in a district. Accordingly, the dependent variable becomes a count 
variable, which suggests the use of Poisson fixed effects regressions. However, one strong 
assumption associated with Poisson regressions is that the mean and variance of the outcome 
variable are equal. This condition does not hold for our sample mainly because many rural districts 
have very low enrollments in charter schools. Indeed, although 295 of Michigan’s 553 districts are 
rural, only 6.7% of Michigan’s charter school students lived in rural districts in 2005.  
The violation of this equal variance and mean condition is commonly designated as an 
overdispersion problem. Applying Poisson regression models to such data can cause substantial 
underestimation of coefficient standard errors and produce inappropriately significant results 
(Osgood, 2000). Negative binomial regression is the best known and most widely available method 
in modeling overdispersed Poisson data (Hilbe, 2007; Osgood, 2000). So, in this analysis, we use 
negative binomial fixed effects regressions to estimate the determinants of charter school 
participation. 
Inter-district choice participation rates are measured as the net outflow of students from a 
district (transfers out minus transfers in) as a percentage of district resident students. Since the 
variable is normally distributed, we estimate Equation (1) for the inter-district choice participation 
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through linear fixed effects regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the district level. In 
contrast to charter school participation which is concentrated in Michigan’s metropolitan areas, 
inter-district participation in spread across community types. In 2005, inter-district choice 
participation rates for central city, suburban and rural districts were 6.0%, 3.0% and 5.5%, 
respectively.5 
Data 
We utilize a statewide panel dataset of Michigan schools from 1995 to 2005. We have been 
able to update some variables, including school choice data, through 2007. Financial and resource 
allocation data (pupil-teacher ratio, per pupil expenditure, percentage of expenditure for instruction) 
were obtained from the Michigan Department of Education (MDE). Student-level data on students’ 
district of residence as well as the district or charter school they attend come from the Single Record 
Student Database (SRSD) maintained by the State of Michigan’s Center for Educational 
Performance and Information. Student achievement data—the percentages of students attaining 
proficient performance levels on the MEAP tests—come from the MDE’s Office of School 
Assessment and Accountability. During the years included in this study, Michigan students were 
only tested in certain grades and subjects. These include reading and math tests in the 4th and 7th 
grades. In addition, the 7th grade math test scores are only available from 1995 to 2000 because the 
test was discontinued between 2001 and 2005.  All achievement data were standardized for 
convenience of interpretation. The merged dataset includes information by district for school choice 
enrollment, student achievement and demographics, and financial and other district-level factors 
over the 11 years.  
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics  
 Mean Std. dev. 
% charter school participation* 1.899 3.843 
% net gain through inter-district choice 0.997 12.230 
% Special education 12.141 3.525 
% Free-reduced lunch 30.572 17.027 
% African-American 5.409 14.901 
% Asian 1.001 1.795 
% Hispanic 2.746 4.847 
Ln(expenditure per pupil) 8.778 0.227 
% Instruction/expenditure 64.340 5.070 
Pupil-teacher ratio 20.407 3.285 
Ln(district enrollment) 7.286 1.339 
*Based on 2003-2005 data. 
 
Our research question suggests that we take districts as the unit of analysis, since it is the 
school district that experiences and responds to competitive pressure from charter schools and 
                                                
5 The 2005 distribution of Michigan’s student population by district of residence is: 22.2% central city, 57.3% 
suburban, and 20.5% rural. The distribution of inter-district transfers by students’ district of residence is: 
26.3% central city, 44.9% suburban, and 28.8% rural.  
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inter-district choice. For each district, we measure charter school participation by the percentage of 
public school students residing in a district who attend a charter school whether or not the charter 
school is located in their district of residence.6 Because this measure requires student-level data, it is 
only available after 2002, the first year the SRSD was collected in Michigan. Consequently, we 
restrict our analysis of charter school participation to the relatively short 2003-2005 period. On the 
other hand, available data enable us to analyze inter-district choice participation for the 1996-2005 
period. Descriptive information for all variables included in the models is summarized in Table 3. 
Empirical Results 
Charter School Participation 
For the sake of comparison, we analyze the determinants of charter school participation 
rates through linear fixed effects regressions before turning to the negative binomial fixed effects 
regressions discussed above. The linear fixed effects regression results are shown in Table 4. The 
specification of each model in the table is the same, except that district academic performance is 
measured by alternative MEAP test scores. In all of the linear models, none of the academic 
performance or demographic characteristics variables shows any effect on charter school 
participation. However, as we explained earlier, linear regression estimates are likely to be misleading 
because the dependent variable—charter school participation—is not normally distributed. 
Table 5 presents the results of the models explaining charter school participation rates 
through the negative binomial fixed effects regressions. The results are strikingly consistent across 
all specifications. In none of the specifications is the charter participation rate significantly 
influenced by the districts’ performance in math or reading. On the other hand, charter participation 
rates are significantly influenced by districts’ socioeconomic status. Charter participation rates 
increase with the share of a district’s students who are from low-income families. The coefficient on 
the % free-reduced lunch variable is 0.022 across all the specifications, implying that a one 
percentage of increase in the share of low-income students in a district is associated with a 2.2 
percent increase in charter school participation among district residents. Alternatively, a one 
standard deviation increase in the percentage of low-income students in a district increases charter 
school participation by approximate 37 percent. Charter participation is not strongly influenced by 
districts’ racial composition, however. Although in all specifications charter participation increases 
with the percentage of a district’s students who are African-American or Asian, and decreases with 
the share who are Hispanic, none of the coefficients is statistically significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6 To assume that students attending a charter lived in the district where the charter school is located would 
distort the analysis. More than one-third of Michigan’s charter schools draw the majority of their students 
from districts other than the district in which the charter school is located. (School-level choice participation 
rates are not available because the SRSD only identifies the resident districts of charter school students.)   
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Table 4  
Determinants of charter school participation rates across Michigan school districts: Fixed effects regressions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
4th Grade math MEAP -.049 (.104) -- -- 
4th Grade reading MEAP -- .046 (.08) -- 
7th Grade reading MEAP -- -- .182 (.116) 
% Special education .042 (.055) 
.038 
(.054) 
.042 
(.057) 
% Free-reduced lunch .066 (.039) 
.066 
(.039) 
.068 
(.039) 
% African-American .03 (.034) 
.034 
(.034) 
.033 
(.034) 
% Asian  .121 (.207) 
.112 
(.204) 
.132 
(.203) 
% Hispanic -.059 (.063) 
-.06 
(.063) 
-.057 
(.06) 
Ln (expenditure per pupil) 8.204** (3.059) 
8.166** 
(3.033) 
7.654** 
(2.849) 
% Instruction/expenditure .078 (.044) 
.079 
(.045) 
.071 
(.044) 
Pupil-teacher ratio .162 (.109) 
.163 
(.108) 
.165 
(.109) 
Ln(district enrollment) 6.428 (5.56) 
6.508 
(5.582) 
6.818 
(5.567) 
Observations  1514 1513 1515 
R-squared  0.12 0.12 0.13 
Dependent variable is the number of students in every 100 students residing in a district who attend charter 
schools. Robust standard errors clustering at district level are in parentheses.* p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
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Table 5  
Determinants of charter school participation rates across Michigan school districts: Negative binomial fixed effects 
regressions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
4th Grade math MEAP -.058 (.043) -- -- 
4th Grade reading MEAP -- -.057 (.04) -- 
7th Grade reading MEAP -- -- .013 (.041) 
% Special education -.001 (.018) 
0 
(.018) 
-.004 
(.018) 
% Free-reduced lunch .022** (.008) 
.022** 
(.008) 
.022** 
(.008) 
% African-American .005 (.02) 
.009 
(.02) 
.01 
(.021) 
% Asian  .089 (.076) 
.096 
(.077) 
.074 
(.076) 
% Hispanic -.029 (.035) 
-.028 
(.035) 
-.03 
(.035) 
Ln(expenditure per pupil) 1.639** (.621) 
1.596** 
(.618) 
1.624** 
(.623) 
% Instruction/expenditure .019 (.017) 
.02 
(.017) 
.023 
(.017) 
Pupil-teacher ratio .02 (.015) 
.02 
(.014) 
.014 
(.014) 
Ln(district enrollment) 1.507** (.347) 
1.548** 
(.345) 
1.37** 
(.317) 
Observations  892 892 895 
Dependent variable is the number of students in every 100 students residing in a district who attend charter 
schools. Standard errors are in parentheses.* p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
 
Charter participation in Michigan also increases significantly in larger enrollment school 
districts. This could reflect the preferences of households (seeking smaller, more intimate and 
responsive educational organizations) or charter school authorizers and managers seeking locations 
in districts with many potential students.7 Participation rates in Michigan’s charter schools also 
                                                
7 One independent source of evidence that households value smaller educational organizations in which they 
may exercise greater influence comes from Brasington’s (2004) study of the impact of school consolidation 
on housing values. In models that controlled for school service quality, property tax rates, and other 
determinants of property values, he found that consolidation lowers the value of single-family homes by 
about 3.5 percent or roughly $3,000 for the average home. An alternative explanation for our enrollment size 
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increase significantly in districts with higher per pupil expenditures. However, participation rates are 
unaffected by key district resource allocation decisions, including the percentage of operating 
expenditures devoted to instruction and pupil-teacher ratios. In each case, the signs and significance 
of these variables are consistent across all three models.  
 In sum, our analysis of the determinants of charter school enrollment in Michigan in 2003-
2005 indicates that participation rates are largely driven by factors over which local districts have 
little control, while they are not affected by factors over which districts do exercise control. In 
Michigan, the rate of districts’ enrollment loss to charter schools is unrelated to their academic 
performance. Districts’ enrollment loss is similarly unrelated to aspects of their instructional 
operations such as class size and how intensively they focus their spending on instruction. 
Meanwhile, the results clearly point to the conclusion that charter participation rates are determined 
by the social characteristics of districts’ students. Students are more likely to choose charter schools 
when their district of residence enrolls high concentrations of low-income students. 
Inter-district Choice Participation  
Available data permit us to perform more intensive analysis of inter-district choice transfers 
over the 1996-2005 period. The results of the fixed effects regressions for Michigan’s inter-district 
choice are shown in Table 6. We also estimated a set of parallel models using lagged predictor 
variables which are presented in Appendix Table A-1. The estimates derived from lagged predictors 
are similar to the results shown in Table 6.8   
Several key findings from our analysis of inter-district choice participation are consistent 
with our findings concerning charter school participation. District academic performance does not 
significantly influence the net flow of inter-district student transfers in any of the model 
specifications presented in Table 6. Meanwhile, as with charter school enrollment, students on 
balance use inter-district choice to leave districts with high concentrations of low-income students. 
A one percentage increase in the share of low-income students in a district corresponds to an 8-9 
percent increase in the net outflow of students through inter-district choice.  
The impacts of other district characteristics on net inter-district flows are also similar to our 
charter school findings. Net student flows under Michigan’s inter-district choice policy are not 
significantly related to districts’ student racial composition. Variables characterizing districts’ racial 
composition are uniformly insignificant across the Table 6 models. Students also tend to leave large 
districts. As in the case of charter participation, the net flow of inter-district transfers is unrelated to 
districts’ pupil-teacher ratios or their share of spending devoted to instruction, while it is significantly 
related to districts’ per-pupil expenditures. Lower-expenditure districts tend to gain students through 
inter-district choice. This likely reflects districts’ supply-side decisions regarding the number of 
openings they provide to nonresident students. Low-revenue districts may seek to supplement 
funding by attracting nonresident students, while high-revenue districts are more reluctant to admit 
nonresident students who bring with them per-pupil funding from districts that is less than their 
                                                                                                                                                       
result is that it represents an urban effect. However, after the state’s largest district, Detroit, most large 
districts in Michigan are suburban. Only six of Michigan’s 20 largest districts are central cities and several 
central city districts are relatively small.  
8 This suggests that a reciprocal relationship wherein school choice participation generates changes in district 
student composition and academic performance is not a problem in our analysis. Our attempts to estimate 
the charter school models in Table 5 with lagged predictors were unsuccessful. The lagging procedure 
eliminated a year’s worth of observations from a relatively short sample period causing the negative binomial 
regressions to fail to converge.   
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own. Finally, in contrast to the charter participation models, net inter-district transfers flow away 
from districts with high concentrations of costly and difficult to educate students with disabilities. 
 
Table 6  
Determinants of districts’ net outflow of students through Michigan’s inter-district choice policy: Fixed effects 
regressions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
4th Grade math MEAP .008 (.145) -- -- 
4th Grade reading MEAP -- -.005 (.151) -- 
7th Grade reading MEAP -- -- -.045 (.175) 
% Special education .453** (.138) 
.463** 
(.135) 
.416** 
(.148) 
% Free-reduced lunch .083* (.039) 
.087* 
(.039) 
.092* 
(.041) 
% African-American -.136 (.102) 
-.137 
(.103) 
-.156 
(.103) 
% Asian  -.046 (.159) 
-.041 
(.16) 
-.07 
(.145) 
% Hispanic -.077 (.077) 
-.082 
(.078) 
-.093 
(.078) 
Ln(expenditure per pupil) 27.367** (3.956) 
27.187** 
(3.914) 
24.771** 
(3.734) 
% Instruction/expenditure -.071 (.066) 
-.063 
(.065) 
-.084 
(.066) 
Pupil-teacher ratio .019 (.086) 
.021 
(.087) 
.026 
(.089) 
Ln(district enrollment) 28.709** (3.794) 
28.404** 
(3.744) 
28.942** 
(3.979) 
Observations 5181 5181 5184 
R2 0.27 0.27 0.26 
The dependent variable is (transfers out minus transfers in) as a percentage of resident students. 
Robust standard errors clustering at district level are in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
 
The analysis of inter-district student flows differs, however, from the measurement of 
charter school participation in one important respect. Net student flows, when used as the 
dependent variable as in Table 6’s models, appropriately measure the intensity of the financial 
pressure that inter-district choice competition exerts on districts. In this sense it is analogous to the 
charter participation rates analyzed earlier. In addition, the focus on net student flows enables us to 
determine whether, for example, the overall movement of students leads to enrollment losses in 
districts with inferior academic performance. On the other hand, net flows will not accurately reflect 
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variations across communities in the volume of choice participation—since a district could have an 
equally large number of students transferring in and out and show no net enrollment change—and 
the two-way movement of students may mask the influence of district characteristics on student 
transfers.9    
 
A Closer Look at Inter-district Student Flows  
To gain further insight on how district characteristics influence student movement under 
inter-district choice, we utilize 2005 student-level data from Michigan’s Single Record Student 
Database to compare the characteristics of the resident and educating districts for students who 
participate in inter-district choice. For each participating student, the value of a given variable in his 
or her resident (or sending) district is subtracted from the value of the corresponding variable in 
their educating (or receiving) district ( i.e., Xreceiving – Xsending). We group all inter-district choice 
participants by their district of residence and then calculate the average difference in variable values 
for each district type and for all inter-district choice transfers statewide.  
Table 7 displays the results of this analysis for a set of student characteristics. Statewide in 
2005, inter-district choice students transferred on average to districts where the share of low-income 
students was 7.7 percentage points lower than in their  home district. Transfers from central city 
districts experienced the largest shifts in their classmates’ socioeconomic status. On average, they 
moved to districts where the share of low-income students was 30 percentage points below the level 
in their district of residence. Statewide, inter-district choice students are also moving to districts 
where the share of African-American students is 9.5 percentage points lower than in the districts 
where they live.10  Central city and low-income suburban district residents are moving, on average, to 
districts where the percentages of African-American students are an extraordinary 39.2 and 30.9 
percentage points less than in their home district, respectively. While choice students are also 
moving to districts with lower shares of special education students, the differences on this count 
between educating and resident districts are less stark. 
Table 8 presents a parallel analysis of the educational performance of inter-district choice 
students’ resident and educating districts. We measure districts’ educational characteristics in two 
ways. One is the actual proficiency rate for a district’s students on the MEAP exams. However, since 
district proficiency rates do not account for student characteristics, they are not a reliable measure of 
academic performance. Consequently, we also use an adjusted performance measure (APM), to 
determine whether students are moving to more effective districts once we control for student 
characteristics.  
Following Stiefel et. al. (2005), the APM index for a school district is constructed as the 
difference between the actual district MEAP proficient rate and the predicted rate, adjusting for 
differences in student background and other characteristics that are outside a school’s control. The 
predictors included are % African-American students, % Hispanic students, % Asian students, % 
                                                
9 Consider a hypothetical example in which there are three types of school districts: a few that are 
predominantly African-American, a few more that are predominantly White, and most that are all White. 
Suppose further that racial considerations strongly influence student transfers such that predominantly 
African-American districts lose students to predominantly White districts, but all-White districts hoping to 
preserve this status accept no out-of-district transfers. In such a case, net transfer models such as those in 
Table 6 may fail to identify a statistically significant relationship between % African-American and net 
outflows, even though race influences the pattern of inter-district transfers.  
10 This figure is remarkably high in view of the fact that African-American’s comprise less than 1.0% of the 
students in 261 of Michigan’s 552 school districts, while they comprise at over 33% of enrollment in only 34 
school districts.  
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free/reduced lunch, district enrollment size, per-pupil current expenditure, and district urbanicity. 
After controlling for these factors, the APM can be regarded as a measure of school efficiency, as 
well as effectiveness (Stiefel, et. al., 2005). We standardize the APM indexes to have a mean of 0 and 
standard deviation of 1.  
On average, statewide, students are moving to districts with slightly higher MEAP scores, 
about three percentage points higher on 4th grade math and reading. This pattern is evident for 
transfers originating in every community type except middle- and high-income suburbs. As noted, 
however, the percentage of students reaching proficiency on the MEAP does not represent district 
effectiveness or efficiency.  
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Table 7 
Characteristics of sending and receiving districts for inter-district choice students in 2005, by sending district type 
% Free-reduced lunch % African-American % Special ed 
Sending district type Sending Receiving Diff Sending Receiving Diff Sending Receiving Diff 
 (1) (2) (2) - (1) (4) (5) (5) - (4) (7) (8) (8) - (7) 
          
Central City 69.4 39.4 -30.0 61.9 22.7 -39.2 17.4 14.0 -3.4 
Low-income suburb 71.0 45.6 -25.5 55.5 24.5 -30.9 15.9 15.7 -0.3 
Mid-income suburb 31.6 33.3 1.7 14.1 14.6 0.5 14.0 14.8 0.9 
High-income suburb 8.8 20.2 11.4 4.3 12.5 8.1 11.9 14.2 2.2 
Rural 40.6 35.8 -4.8 2.0 2.2 0.1 13.8 13.2 -0.6 
Total 42.8 35.1 -7.7 23.2 13.7 -9.5 14.7 14.2 -0.4 
          
All percentages are weighted by the number of transfer students. 
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Table 8  
MEAP test scores and efficiency of sending and receiving districts for inter-district choice students in 2005, by 
sending district type 
Sending district type Sending Receiving Diff Sending Receiving Diff 
 (1) (2) (2) - (1) (4) (5) (5) - (4) 
       
 4th Math MEAP % Proficient 4th Math efficiency (APM) 
Central city 55 70 15 0.06 -0.16 -0.22 
Low-income suburb 58 66 7 0.43 -0.21 -0.64 
Mid-income suburb 74 72 -2 -0.13 -0.13 0.00 
High-income suburb 86 77 -9 -0.04 -0.10 -0.06 
Rural 71 75 4 0.05 0.09 0.04 
Total 69 72 3 -0.01 -0.08 -0.07 
       
 4th Reading MEAP % Proficient 4th Reading efficiency (APM) 
Central City 71 81 10 0.08 -0.13 -0.21 
Low-income suburb 69 79 10 0.24 -0.05 -0.30 
Mid-income suburb 84 83 -1 -0.06 -0.12 -0.06 
High-income suburb 91 87 -4 -0.20 0.01 0.20 
Rural 79 84 5 0.00 0.11 0.10 
Total 80 83 3 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 
       
All percentages are weighted by the number of transfer students. 
 
If we address this by representing academic outcomes with the APM index, then 
choice students overall are moving to districts that are slightly less efficient than their 
resident districts. Results on this count, however, vary across community types. Students 
from central-cities and low-income suburbs—where racial and economic differences with 
respect to receiving districts are large--are moving on average to districts that are 
academically less efficient than their home districts. Meanwhile, in rural areas—which are 
generally characterized by much smaller socioeconomic differences between sending and 
receiving districts--students move to districts that are slightly more efficient.  
Conclusions 
 Choice policies are intended to provide students who are assigned to poorly 
performing public schools the option to switch to better schools. This notion has always 
been central to the advocacy for school choice policies in the United States, and it is widely 
assumed that choice policy participation is, in fact, greatest in areas where students’ assigned 
public schools are least effective. The common perception that school choice activity tends 
to be concentrated in urban settings, where the shortcomings of public schools have been 
extensively documented, tends to reinforce this view. Nevertheless, there has been little 
rigorous study of whether the conventional wisdom is correct.  
Our analysis of Michigan’s charter school and inter-district choice policies indicates 
that the academic performance of public schools in students’ districts of residence has 
virtually no systematic influence on variations across districts in school choice participation. 
Choice activity, on the other hand, is significantly influenced by the socioeconomic 
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characteristics of students’ assigned public schools. In districts enrolling high levels of low-
income students, parents move their children to charter schools and other districts through 
inter-district choice. In the case of inter-district choice, they also tend to transfer to district 
with much lower percentages of African-American students. In short, our results indicate 
that in Michigan, a state with relatively high levels of participation in two long-established 
school choice policies, the market signals these policies provide to school personnel have 
very little to do with the student academic outcomes they strive to improve.  
Choice participation is jointly influenced by actions on the demand and supply sides 
of the education market. This study has not attempted to disentangle the influence of 
parental preferences from the supply side location, programmatic and enrollment decisions 
of charter school authorizers and managers or the decisions of school districts with regard to 
the number and type of openings they make available to nonresident students. It is possible, 
however, that appropriate changes in state laws and guidelines governing the implementation 
of these choice policies could bring participation rates more closely in line with variations in 
school performance.   
It is also possible that a school-level analysis would reveal a stronger influence of 
achievement on family school choices than we have found. Such a result, moreover, could 
stand alongside our finding that at the district level—where the financial pressures arising 
from choice-induced enrollment loss are realized—choice participation rates are unrelated to 
academic effectiveness. 
In addition, a district-level analysis, such as ours, cannot reveal which students leave 
their assigned public schools for choice schools. Studies that utilize student-level data are 
therefore needed to offer more refined analyses of the contours of families’ demand for 
schooling as well as how choice policies influence who goes to school with whom. Available 
evidence on this question, however, indicates that the sorting process tends to leave 
traditional public schools with higher concentrations of disadvantaged students, including 
those who are poor and non-white, and who have disabilities (Ni, 2011; Bifulco et al., 2009).  
From a policy standpoint, the fact that district academic effectiveness does not 
determine choice participation rates might not be cause for concern if charter competition 
(whatever its determinants) nonetheless improved academic performance in districts exposed 
to increased competition. Recent research on charter schools’ competitive effect on district 
academic performance in Michigan, however, fails to find positive impacts (Ni, 2009; 
Bettinger, 2005). On the other hand, charter competition does produce a significant 
deterioration of districts’ financial positions, as reflected in their fund balances, because it 
causes revenues to decline faster than costs (Arsen & Ni, 2011). 
Most of Michigan’s urban school districts have experienced acute financial pressure 
because of the loss of students to charter schools and suburban districts through inter-
district choice. For example, about 44,000 students who live in Detroit attended charter 
schools in 2006. Together with 8,000 students attending suburban schools through inter-
district choice, Detroit Public Schools lost about one-third of its students, amounting to an 
annual loss of about $400 million in revenue to the two choice programs. Our data indicate 
that other central cities in Michigan, such as Flint, Pontiac, and Benton Harbor have 
experienced similar proportionate losses. 
Educators in these districts are operating in extraordinarily turbulent settings. Fewer 
than half of the TPS students in these four districts in 2002-03 attended the same school in 
2003-04. These four districts enroll about 10 percent of all TPS students in Michigan, but 
enroll half of TPS students statewide who are black and eligible for free and reduced price 
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lunch. Large-scale closures of school buildings have been implemented (roughly half of the 
schools in Detroit Public Schools have been closed since 2002) and teachers and 
administrators are being relocated from building to building. These and other Michigan 
districts serving large concentrations of low-income students appear to have entered a self-
reinforcing downward spiral, as students move to choice schools, forcing program cuts and 
school closures, which in turn increase the likelihood that other students will leave, and so 
on.11    
There is little question, therefore, that choice policies are helping to shake up 
established practices in Michigan districts that are responsible for educating large portions of 
the state’s most disadvantaged students. We failed to uncover evidence, however, that these 
districts were the ones that were least effective in their academic performance once student 
background characteristics are accounted for.    
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Appendix 
Table A-1  
Determinants of districts’ net outflow of students through Michigan’s inter-district choice policy:   Fixed effects 
regressions with lagged independent variables  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
4th Grade math MEAP -.056 (.146) -- -- 
4th Grade reading MEAP -- -.008 (.16) -- 
7th Grade reading MEAP -- -- .048 (.194) 
% Special education .402** (.142) 
.409** 
(.141) 
.352* 
(.141) 
% Free-reduced lunch .108** (.033) 
.114** 
(.033) 
.089* 
(.035) 
% African-American -.131 (.13) 
-.126 
(.131) 
-.118 
(.129) 
% Asian  -.012 (.109) 
-.004 
(.108) 
-.014 
(.105) 
% Hispanic -.08 (.083) 
-.082 
(.084) 
-.083 
(.087) 
Ln(expenditure per pupil) 23.524** (3.254) 
23.013** 
(3.169) 
26.174** 
(3.956) 
% Instruction/expenditure -.069 (.066) 
-.06 
(.065) 
-.065 
(.067) 
Pupil-teacher ratio .165 (.108) 
.158 
(.108) 
.159 
(.107) 
Ln(district enrollment) 21.251** (2.752) 
20.726** 
(2.637) 
20.583** 
(3.087) 
Observations 4677 4674 4677 
R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 
All independent variables are lagged for one year. See Table 6 for other notes. 
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